Butler, Judith. Excitable Speech: A Politics of Performance (1997)
We ascribe agency to language, a power to injure and position ourselves as the objects of its injurious trajectory.
We exercise the force of language even as we seek to counter its force, caught up in a bind that no act of censorship can undo.
Language could not injure us if we were not, in some sense, linguistic beings (like Ong) who require language in order to be. Is our vulnerability to language a consequence of our being constituted within its terms?
If we are formed in language then that formative power precedes and conditions any decision we might make about it, insulting us from the start, as it were by its prior power.
Name calling—can be good or bad. Calling by a name or calling out of a name.
Butler looks for the force of negative interpellation in insults.
Austin said—it’s performative and one must first locate the utterance within a total speech situation.
The elocutionary speech act performs its deed at the moment of utterance, and yet to the extent that the moment is ritualized, it is never a single moment.
To be injured by speech is to suffer a loss of context, that is, not to know where you are.
It is described as physical “wound” a “slap in the face” she says a metaphorical connection between the physical and linguistic vulnerability is essential to the description of linguistic vulnerability
Certain words –forms of address—not only operate as threats to one's physical well-being but there is a strong sense in which the body is alternately sustained and threatened through modes of address “honey” “idiot”
One exists by being recognizable and recognized.
Language carries with it the possibilities for violence and world shattering
Scarry says language cannot fully describe body pain, but Butler is going elsewhere, the pain in language is equally dangerous.
Quotes Toni Morrison 1993 Nobel Lecture in Lit: “Oppressive language does more than represent violence; it is violence”
Language as a living thing—language as agency—an act with consequences.
“We die. Than may be the meaning of life. But we do language. That may be the measure of our lives”
Agency does not equal control but doing—mastery and control may be there or not.
I think it’s almost like string theory; operates as vital on 3 planes—actual, imagined, and possible in lives of speakers, readers, and writers.
The speech act says more, or says differently than it means to say.
The body and language can threaten intrusion or be opposite.
The notion that speech wounds appears to rely on this inseparable and incongruous relation between body and speech but also consequently between speech and effects.
The body of the addressee comes into play as well
As an instrument of violent rhetorocity, the body of the speaker exceeds the words that are spoken, exposing the addressed body as no longer (and not ever fully) in his own control—Butler.
Hard to find words on their own that wound—it’s context. Bitch friend /bitch bitch. Nigger/nigger.
“My presumption is that speech is always out of our control” Butler
Agency begins where sovereignty wanes: hate speech is sovereign—we expect it to be followed upon agency is the heat of the moment.
Hate speech requires ethos or lack of ethos.
Speech does not merely reflect a relation of social domination; speech enacts domination becoming the vehicle through which that social structure is reinstated.
Pornography is construed as a type of hate speech.
Burning crosses—hate speech? Act? Something in between?
Look up interpellation. It is an act of speech whose content is neither true nor false—its purpose is only to indicate and establish a subject.
Even silence can be hate speech
Exposing hate speech can make it circulate. Ignoring it can make it worse—no easy answer
The subject who speaks hate speech is clearly responsible for such speech, but that object is rarely the originator of such speech. It’s on a loop.
Sometimes the speech is a safety valve diffusing action, sometimes inciting action.
Naming groups, “it’s a girl” and the chain begins transitive. Race in same way.
In Excitable Speech, Butler surveys the problems of hate speech and censorship. She argues that censorship is difficult to evaluate, and that in some cases it may be useful or even necessary, while in others it may be worse than tolerance. She develops a new conception of censorship’s complex workings, supplanting the myth of the independent subject who wields the power to censor with a theory of censorship as an effect of state power and, more primordially, as the condition of language and discourse itself.
Butler argues that hate speech exists retrospectively, only after being declared such by state authorities. In this way, the state reserves for itself the power to define hate speech and, conversely, the limits of acceptable discourse. In this connection, Butler criticizes feminist legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon's argument against pornography for its unquestioning acceptance of the state’s power to censor. Butler warns that such appeals to state power may backfire on those like MacKinnon who seek social change, in her case to end patriarchal oppression, through legal reforms. She cites for example the R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul 1992 Supreme Court case, which overturned the conviction of a teenager for burning a cross on the lawn of an African American family, in the name of the First Amendment.
Deploying Foucault’s argument from The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, Butler claims that any attempt at censorship, legal or otherwise, necessarily propagates the very language it seeks to forbid.[11] As Foucault argues, for example, the strict sexual mores of 19th century Western Europe did nothing but amplify the discourse of sexuality it sought to control. Extending this argument using Derrida and Lacan, Butler claims that censorship is primitive to language, and that the linguistic “I” is a mere effect of an originary censorship. In this way, Butler questions the possibility of any genuinely oppositional discourse; "If speech depends upon censorship, then the principle that one might seek to oppose is at once the formative principle of oppositional speech".
Butler also questions the efficacy of censorship on the grounds that hate speech is context-dependent. Citing J.L. Austin's concept of the performative utterance, Butler notes that words’ ability to “do things” makes hate speech possible but also at the same time dependent on its specific embodied context.[citation needed] Austin’s claim that what a word “does,” its elocutionary force, varies with the context in which it is uttered implies that it is impossible to adequately define the performative meanings of words, including hate, abstractly.[citation needed] On this basis, Butler rejects arguments like Richard Delgado’s which justify the censorship of certain specific words by claiming the use of those words constitutes hate speech in any context. In this way, Butler underlines the difficulty inherent in efforts to systematically identify hate speech.
Butler, Judith. Excitable Speech: A Politics of Performance (1997)